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RECENT DECISIONS

LIBEL AND SLANDER EXTENSION OF THE DocTRINE OF ABSOLUTE
PRIVILEGE TO INFERIOR EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS In

accordance with the Ohio Constitution, which provides that a copy of proposed
amendments shall be distributed to the electorate together with an argument
both for and against the proposed amendments,1 the governor of the state appointed defendant to prepare arguments against certain proposed amendments
to the state constitution. The report contained the statement that plaintiff,
sponsor of the proposed amendments, was "a paid lobbyist for the single tax
movement." Plaintiff brought suit for libel. Held, that since the defendants
were members of the commission appointed by the governor acting in the discharge of their official duty, they were absolutely privileged in making any
statement pertinent to the occasion. Bigelow 'll. Brumley, 138 Ohio 574, 37
N. E. (2d) 584 (1941).
In addition to utterances in legislative and judicial proceedings and communications by military and naval officers,2 it is now generally held that communications of high executive officials, made in discharge of their official duties, are
absolutely privileged. 3 There is also a trend to extend the doctrine to inferior
judicial 4 and executive 5 officers and likewise to members of administrative tribu-

1

Ohio Const. (1851), art. 2, § 1(g).
NEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL, 4th ed., 388 (1924).
3
Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 16 S. Ct. 631 (1896) (Postmaster-General of
the United States); Mellon v. Brewer, 57 App. D. C. 126, 18 F. (2d) 168 (1927),
cert. denied 275 U. S. 530, 48 S. Ct. 28 (1927) (United States Secretary of the
Treasury); Glass v. Ickes, 73 App. D. C. 3, 117 F. (2d) 273 (1940), cert. denied
311 U.S. 718, 61 S. Ct. 441 (1941) (United States Secretary of Agriculture). This
extension of the doctrine has been codified in 3 ToRTS RESTATEMENT 238, § 591
(1938).
4
Fisher v. Payne, 93 Fla. 1085, 113 So. 378 (1927) (commissioners, committeemen and other like functionaries who are lawfully required by courts of competent
jurisdiction to examine persons or things and report their findings to the court) ;
Mickens v. Davis, 13 2 Kan. 49, 294 P. 896 ( I 93 I) (report of physiciaI). appointed
by a court to examine claimant in workmen's compensation action, analogous to evidence
of witness in court).
5
United States, to use of Parravicino v. Brunswick, 63 App. D. C. 65, 69 F.
(2d) 383 (1934) (official report by a consul to his superior); De Arnaud v. Ainsworth,
24 App. D. C. 167 (1904) (report of the Chief of the Record and Pension Office to
the Secretary of War); Farr v. Valentine, 38 App. D. C. 413 (1912) (letter from the
2
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nals. 6 This is facilitated by state statutes defining privileges.7 In applying the
doctrine to officials of the executive department, the courts uniformly restrict
the privilege to communications relative to the duties of the officialinvolved. 8 The
scope of the executive function, however, has been given a broad interpretation.9
Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior); Donner v. Francis,
255 Ill. App. 409 (1930) (statement of superior hospital officials to the United States
Veterans Bureau in re removal of a subordinate); Cooper v. O'Connor, 69 App. D. C.
100, 99 F. (2d) 135 (1938) (action for malicious prosecution against prosecuting
officer); Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 63 App. D. C. 339, 72 F. (2d) 577
(1934), cert. denied 293 U. S. 605, 55 S. Ct. 124 (1934) (assistant Secretary of the
Treasury of the United States); Lang v. Wood, 67.App. D. C. 287, 92 F. (2d) 2II
(1937) (members of the United States Parole Board, the parole executive, the warden
of a federal penitentiary, and the Director of the Bureau of Prisons); Brown v.
Rudolph, 58 App. D. C. 116, 25 F. (2d) 540 (1928), cert. denied 277 U. S. 605,
48 S. Ct. 601 (1928) (Commissioner of the District of Columbia); Smith v. O'Brien,
66 App. D. C. 387, 88 F. (2d) 769 (1937) (Chairman of the Tariff Commission);
White v. Brinkman, 23 Cal. App. (2d) 307, 73 P. (2d) 254 (1937) (building inspector); Trebilcock v. Anderson, II7 Mich. 39, 75 N. W. 129 (1898) (veto message from mayor to city council); United States v. Birdsall, 233 U. S. 223, 34 S. Ct.
512 (1914) (communication by Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the President).
Contra: Greenwood v. Cobbey, 26 Neb. 449 (1889) (statement to city council by
mayor about city attorney; council had the power to remove the city attorney; qualified
privilege); Raymond v. Croll, 233 Mich. 268, 206 N. W. 556 (1925), noted 24
MICH. L. REv. 737 (1926) (communication by state budget director in investigating
and reporting the financial standing of bidders on state highway contracts as required
by the administrative board of which he was not a member; qualified privilege).
6
McAlister & Co. v. Jenkins, 214 Ky. 802, 284 S. W. 88 (1926) (real estate
commission with duty to conduct hearings and determine revocation of licenses of real
estate salesmen; analogy to judicial proceeding); Bolton v. Walker, 197 Mich. 699,
164 N. W. 420 (1917) (statement of ex officio members of Detroit Board of Estimates
at regular meeting of board; analogous to legislative proceeding); Higgins v. Williams
Pocahontas Coal Co., 103 W. Va. 504, 138 S. E. 112 (1927) (state compensation
commission investigating claims for workmen's compensation; analogous to judicial
proceeding); Barton v. Rogers, 21 Idaho 609, 123 P. 478 (1912) (board of trustees
of independent school district) ; Haskell v. Perkins, I 6 5 Ill. App. 144 ( I 91 l) ( architect working under board of education); Krumin v. Brugnis, 255 Ill. App. 503 (1930)
(affidavits presented by an individual to the Naturalization Bureau of the Department
of Labor in re applicant for citizenship); Alagna v. New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co.,
155 Misc. 796, 279 N. Y. S. 319 (1935) (letter from steamship company to the
Federal Radio Commission protesting radio operators' conduct in demanding new contracts at sailing time; emphasis on commission's judicial function).
7
38 MICH. L. REV. 732 (1940).
8
See cases cited in note 5, supra.
9
Cooper v. O'Connor, 69 App. D. C. 100 at 104, 99 F. (2d) 135 (1938):
"It is not necessary-in order that acts may be done within the scope of official
authority-that they should be prescribed by statute; or even that they should be specifically directed or requested by a superior officer. It is sufficient if they are done by
an officer 'in relation to matters committed by law to his control or supervision'; or
that they have 'more or less connection witk the general matters committed by law
to his control or supervision'; or that they are governed by a lawful requirement of the
department under whose authority the officer is acting."
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It is generally agreed that the immunity of absolute privilege should be limited
by the considerations which give rise to its creation.10 The immunity has rightly
been confined to those situations where public policy favoring complete freedom
of expression prevents an inquiry into whether or not the speaker was motivated
by malice.11 Individuals may be forced to suffer without a remedy because of
urgent considerations of public policy requiring complete freedom of expression.12
Extension of this absolute privilege to certain inferior executive officers and
members of administrative tribunals is in accord with this general policy. It is
not the particular office occupied by the individual that should determine the
existence of the privilege, but rather the particular duties that the individual
must perform.13 The principal case, in both reasoning and result, fits into the
trend of the decided cases. To fulfill the purpose of the Ohio constitutional
provision to provide the electorate with an adequate discussion of the merits and
demerits of proposed amendments, it is highly desirable that those who have the
duty of providing the public with information relative to the proposed amendments should be able to do so without fear of being subject to suits for libel. The
fear, expressed in some quarters,14 that the immunity will be extended to persons
not entitled to it is unwarranted provided the courts which extend the doctrine
do so with a clear recognition of the public policy involved.15
10
NEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL, 4th ed., 387 (1924), principal case, 37 N. E.
(2d) 584. And see cases cited in notes 4, 5, and 6, supra.
11
In considering whether public policy is being served by the granting of the
privilege, the particular official who libelled the complainant is not to be considered
but rather the large body of officials who may be subjected to unwarranted suits if the
privilege is withheld. "The policy of the law is, therefore, and the reason of the rule
is, that although upon rare occasions judges and other public officials upon whom are
imposed by law judicial or quasi-judicial duties may maliciously slander or calumniate
in the exercise of their authority, it is better that they should be protected upon such
occasions by this absolute privilege than that the great body of such officials in the
conscientious exercise of their duties should be hampered continually by the threat of
such civil actions." McAlister & Co. v. Jenkins, 214 Ky. 802 at 808, 284 S. W. 88
(1926).
12
For a general discussion of the subject of privilege in this and other fields of
tort law, see 22 VA. L. REv. 642 (1936).
18
"It is, therefore, not the particular position of the party making the report or
communication that entitles it to absolute privilege so much as the occasion for making
it, and the reasons of public policy for the immunity." De Arnaud v. Ainsworth, 24
App. D. C. 167 at 181 (1904). "The reason now given for the rule is simply one of
public policy." Cooper v. O'Connor, 69 App. D. C. 100 at 106, 99 F. (2d) 135
(1938). The American Law Institute expresses no opinion on this aspect of the question. 3 ToRTs RESTATEMENT 239, § 591, comment d, caveat: "The Institute expresses
no opinion as to whether the rule stated in this Section is also applicable to other civil
officers or to military and naval officers of the State or Nation, who perform important
governmental functions."
14
NEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL, 4th ed., 387 (1924); Raymond v. Croll, 233
Mich. 268, 206 N. W. 556 (1925); 3 GA. B. J. No. 4, 73 (1941).
15 An example of the correct appreciation of public policy is Colpoys v. Gates,
73 App. D. C. 193 at 194, II8 F. (2d) 16 (1941), where the court in refusing to
grant absolute immunity to a United States marshal who published statements explaining his dismissal of certain deputies when he had no duty to publish such statements
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said: "In the cas~s which have extended an absolute privilege to administrative officers
without policy-determining functions, the thing held to be privileged has usually if not
always been an act in the general line of duty, not a separate discussion or explanation."

